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Abstract. Although the argumentation justifying decisions in particu-
lar cases has always been central to AI and Law, it has recently become
a burning issue as black box machine learning approaches become preva-
lent. In this paper we review the understanding of legal argument that
has been developed in AI and Law, and indicate the most appropriate
ways in which Machine Learning approaches can contribute to legal argu-
ment. We identify some key questions that must be explored to provide
acceptable explanations for legal ML systems. This provides the context
and directions of our current research project.
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1 Introduction
The use of Machine Learning (ML) techniques to produce algorithms to classify
new instances on the basis of a large set of past instances has become preva-
lent: so much so that this approach is now almost synonymous with “Artificial
Intelligence” in the popular press. Where these systems explain their reasoning
it is typically in terms of the algorithm: they may identify the words of features
that contributed most to the classification, or display some sort of visualisation
in the form of a “heatmap” [23]. Explanations of legal decisions are, however,
somewhat different from those required in many other ML applications. The
outcome of a case is not a property waiting to be discovered, but the result of a
decision made by the appropriate empowered authority, such as a judge. Now,
it may be that the explanation of how the decision was made can be something
non-legal: for example it has been found that judges can be more lenient before
lunch and towards the end of the day [19]. Such an explanation is not, however,
what is required for a legal decision. What is required is a justification of how
the decision represents the application of the law. The explanation of legal de-
cisions must take the form of an argument able to persuade its audience of the
correctness of the decision, in terms of the applicable law. To achieve this, the
argument must be couched in natural terms, so that the decision can be seen to
follow from the law, rather than in the quasi-statistical terms that would explain
how an ML algorithm had arrived at its prediction.
There has in recent years been an explosion of interest in the application of
ML techniques to law. Several tasks have been addressed including case retrieval
[33], summarisation [14], and legal argumentation mining [39]. In this paper,
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however, we will focus on the important class of applications intended to support
the task of deciding legal cases. This task has received attention from many
researchers: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) alone has been
the subject domain of a number of studies including [4], [26], [18], and [24].
A prediction of the outcome of a case on its own, however, offers little help
to a person charged with deciding the case. This is discussed in [11] where it
is cogently argued that, without an explanation of why the case was so clas-
sified, the adjudicator has no reason to follow the advice. The performance of
prediction systems is by no means perfect (typically less that 80%), so there can
be no assurance that the outcome will be correct, and the law requires a very
high degree of certainty. Judges will therefore still need to form their own in-
dependent opinion and without the reasons for the machine opinion they would
have no reason to give any weight to that of the machine. Moreover, there are
reasons to believe that the machine will not be able to learn the applicable law.
For one thing, as argued in [8], the data used to train the system is likely to
contain decisions reflecting bias and misunderstanding, and changes in law and
societal values mean that decisions become increasingly unreliable as they age
[26]. Moreover, even if the dataset is perfect, empirical work has shown that it
may fail to find the correct rationale for its decisions (see [7] and [35]). This
means that an explanation of the machine’s suggestion is required if incorrect
rationales are not to be applied.
We will consider how ML can support legal decision making, given that what
is required is an outcome accompanied by an argument which justifies that out-
come in terms of the applicable law. We will first review work on the generation
of such arguments in AI and Law, then consider what part ML approaches might
play and how we are addressing this topic in our current project.
2 Modelling Legal Argument in AI and Law
Arguments justifying legal decisions have been a central concern of AI and Law
since 1976 when McCarty’s TAXMAN [25] attempted to model both the major-
ity and minority arguments in the famous tax law case of Eisner v Macomber.
Most influential has been the stream of work on modelling US Trade Secrets
Law originating in HYPO [31], developed further in CATO [5] and subsequently
explored by many others [6]. This work has shown that legal argumentation in
cases can be seen as passing through a series of layers, as articulated in [2].
The top layers supply a logical framework: this may derive from statute law
[34], or emerge from case law [30]. Thus for Trade Secrets Law, in order to find
for the plaintiff, the information must be both a Trade Secret and have been mis-
appropriated. To be a Trade Secret the information must be valuable and have
had adequate measures taken to protect its secrecy. To have been misappropri-
ated there must have been a breach of confidence or the use of improper means
to obtain the information. These elements, known as issues, form an and/or tree
with the children providing necessary and sufficient conditions for their parent.
At this level the explanation can be in terms of these logical rules: e.g. find for
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the defendant because the information was not a Trade Secret and it was not a
Trade Secret because the measures taken to protect its secrecy were inadequate.
The next layer comprises factors, a notion made popular by CATO [5]. Fac-
tors are stereotypical patterns of fact that provide a (non-conclusive) reason to
decide for one side or the other. In Trade Secrets Law, these include: whether the
information was disclosed in negotiations; whether the information was known
to be confidential ; and the ease with which the information was reverse engineer-
able by inspecting the product. Like issues, factors can form a tree, with abstract
factors explained in terms of base level factors. Unlike issues, factors do not pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions for their parents: they provide reasons
for and against the presence of the parent, which must be weighed against one
another and a preference expressed. Precedent cases provide a source of such
preferences. Where the question has been considered previously, the decision in
the previous case constrains the decision: where the question has not previously
arisen the court must make a choice which will constrain future decisions. Thus,
at this layer we get a rather different style of argument, taking the form of a
statement of the factors (the reasons for both sides), the status of the issue under
consideration, and a precedent justifying the preference that gave that status.
For example where the information had been disclosed in negotiations but the
defendant was aware that the information was confidential, a duty of confidence
existed (cite National Rejectors v Trieman 1966).
Below factors are the facts, and it is on the basis of these that the factors
are ascribed. Often this will require argument: for example if the defendant
has claimed that the information was not valuable because it could be reverse
engineered, the court will need to look closely at the “ease or difficulty with which
the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others” to decide
whether the facts do indeed suggest that this was a reason for the defendant and
that the factor reverse engineerable can be ascribed. An example of an argument
at this level can be found in Technicon Data Systems Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc:
“The Court reasoned that the process had required over two-thousand hours,
and still had not yielded a fully functional product. The Court held that this
amount of time indicated that a trade secret was not readily ascertainable.”
At the very lowest layer is the evidence on which the facts are based, which
will include witness testimony, forensic evidence and the like. The reasoning
here is not specifically legal, but is similar to that used to establish the truth
of matters in everyday life. Indeed, the facts are often decided not by lawyers,
but by a lay jury. In higher courts, where a decision is appealed, the facts are
usually taken as those established by the lower court. Although arguments based
on evidence have received attention in AI and Law in, for example, [13] and [37],
we will not consider them further in this paper, concentrating instead on the
distinctively legal arguments.
2.1 Layers of Reasoning in AI and Law
Although the complete justification of a legal decision would involve starting
from the evidence and working through the facts, factors, and issues to reach
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Table 1. Layers of Statements in a Legal Decision and Some Example Systems
Statement Type BNA [32] HYPO [31] CATO [5] IBP [17] Bex et al. [12] NIHL [3]
Outcome X X X
Issues X X X X
Factors X X X X
Facts X X X
Evidence X
the final verdict, few approaches have examined the entire process. The focus
in evidential approaches such as [12] was resolving conflicting stories as to the
facts, and other systems have covered different parts of the range.
Approaches based of the formalisation of legislation [32] are concerned only
with the uppermost levels: they ask users to resolve the issues and the system
provides the outcome based on their answers. CATO [5] took the factors as input
and produced arguments for both sides, leaving it to the user to resolve these
arguments to reach a decision. IBP [17], extended the CATO approach with a
logical model of the issues so that it could predict outcomes. HYPO represented
cases as facts and identified the applicable dimensions to enable factors to be
ascribed. It did not use issues and the user was left to decide which side was
favoured on these dimensions, and how these resolved the overall case.
The ANGELIC methodology [1] addresses all the layers above evidence. Us-
ing ANGELIC, knowledge is represented as an Abstract Dialectical Framework
(ADF) [16]. The ADF has the form of a tree, beginning with verdict and then
working through the different statement types. In an ADF each node is associ-
ated with acceptance conditions local to the node, which determine the status of
the node in terms of its children. Because these acceptance conditions are local
to a node they can reflect the different reasoning styles used for the different
statement types: the upper layers can use propositional formulae, while the is-
sues can be resolved using prioritised combinations of factors to reflect reasoning
with the weighing of reasons for and against, often termed ‘balance of factors’
reasoning [36]. At the very lowest level the use of thresholds can convert dimen-
sional facts and probabilities into factors. A full application of the methodology
to a real world application is given in [3]. An example ADF for Trade Secrets
law is given in [9]. The coverage of various systems is summarised in Table 1.
3 Explaining Predictions from ML Approaches
Little attention is paid to the explanation or justification of the prediction in
current work using ML, e.g. [4], [26], [18], and [24]. One of them [4], however,
did offer a list of twenty words, listed in order of their Support Vector Machine
weight. The list for violation of article 6 in the ECHR domain, was:
court, applicant, article, judgment, case, law, proceeding, application,
government, convention, time, article convention, January, human, lodged,
domestic, February, September, relevant, represented
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Such a list inspires no confidence in the sound legal basis of the prediction:
indeed finding month names among the most predictive words suggests rather
that the algorithm is relying on features of the data which have no legal signif-
icance and so should be irrelevant. Certainly there is nothing here that would
form the basis of a persuasive argument. A subsequent work [18] did not attempt
to provide any justification and commented on those produced in [4] saying that
they “are far from being justifications that legal practitioners could trust”.
The above systems take as input a natural language description of the facts
of the case and output a prediction of the outcome. But, as we discussed in
the previous section, legal reasoning must pass through several stages between
facts and outcome, and arguments justifying the outcome are naturally expressed
in terms of issues and factors, not facts. The justification needs to bridge this
conceptual gulf between outcome and facts by the use of legally pertinent legal
concepts: issues and factors. This suggests that if we are to be able to justify the
outcome, we need to learn the factors present in the case.
This is the basis of the approach taken by Branting et al. [15]. Their approach
is applied to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) domain name
dispute cases and exploits structural and semantic regularities in case corpora to
identify textual patterns that have both predictable relationships to case deci-
sions and explanatory value: these regularities essentially correspond to factors.
The approach used is a semi-supervised one that makes use of a manually an-
notated set of representative cases. The manually annotated set is a very small
proportion of the available corpus (25 of the 16,024 available).
Branting et al. in [15] do not propose any particular method of explanation
using the factors, One possible model, used in [28], is provided by CATO. In
CATO the justification takes the form of a three-ply argument. In the first ply a
proponent cites the most-on-point precedent (i.e. the precedent with the greatest
overlap of factors, irrespective of which side they favour, decided for the side
being argued for). In the second ply the opponent either cites a counterexample
(a case which favours the other side and is at least as on point as the case cited
by the proponent) or distinguishes the precedent by pointing to a pro factor in
the precedent but not the new case, or a con factor in the current case but not
the precedent. In the third ply the proponent offers a rebuttal by distinguishing
the counterexamples, or downplaying the distinguishing factor by pointing to a
factor which can cancel the additional factor or a factor which can be substituted
for the absent factor. These moves were represented as a set of argument schemes
in [29], and [28] builds a 3-layer tree based on these schemes. In CATO, the user
must decide whether the rebuttals succeed or not but, if we have a predicted
outcome, we can explain it by making that side the proponent and knowing that
the rebuttal of the opponent’s objection will have succeeded in order to establish
that particular decision.
This technique is illustrated in [28] with an example of three cases based on
US Trade Secrets Law. The cases, which we have given mnemonic names, are
shown in Table 2:
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Table 2. Cases in the Example From [28]
Case Outcome Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors
Deceived P SecurityMeasures Deception Disclosures AvailableElsewhere
NoMeasures D Bribery Disclosures AvailableElsewhere
Bribed TBA Bribery SecurityMeasures Disclosures ReverseEngineerable
If the new case, Bribed, is decided for the plaintiff we can form a tree of
arguments as shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Example Dialogue Tree From [28]
Because the decision was for the plaintiff, we know that the distinctions were
successfully substituted or cancelled, but in fact not all of the arguments should
succeed. Examining the nodes with the benefit of domain knowledge, we can
see that Bribery can substitute for Deception, because they are different forms
of improper behaviour. Deception cannot, however, cancel AvailableElsewhere
because they relate to two quite different issues. Similarly while AvailableElse-
where can substitute for ReverseEngineerable, Bribery cannot be substituted for
it because it relates to a different issue. The problem is that a ‘balance of fac-
tors’ argument is being used to explain the case as a whole, whereas this form
of argument is only appropriate to the layer in which issues are resolved. The
need to use factors to justify the resolution of issues, and then issues to justify
the overall decision is argued in [10].
Thus in order to provide a good justification, it is necessary to have a knowl-
edge of the domain structure in terms of issues and factors, so that the appropri-
ate style of argumentation can be used at each level. This structure is provided in
[15] because the initial annotations identify argument elements including issues
and factors. The required analysis is also encapsulated in the ADF produced by
the ANGELIC methodology [1].
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There remains the task of justifying the attribution of the factors on the
basis of the facts. This stage of the argument has received little attention in the
AI and Law literature, which has typically taken the factors present in a case as
given. The experiments in [15] suggest that highlighting the predictive elements
in the natural language statement of the facts description did not provide a
useful justification of the overall decision. It may, however, be that identifying
the elements in the fact description used to ascribe the factors, does provide a
helpful justification of this step. This is an idea worth exploring.
4 Roles for Machine Learning
Justification of a legal decision needs two components. First, an understanding
of the legal domain, as established in statute and case law, is needed to structure
the justification and to enable a smooth passage from facts to factors to issues
to the overall outcome. Second, knowledge of the individual case is needed so
that it can be related to this structure. Structural knowledge comprises:
– The issues that must be resolved if a decision is to be made for a particular
party, and the logical relations between them;
– The factors that are used to resolve the issues, and the preferences between
them established by precedent cases;
– The facts which need to be considered to ascribe the factors. Again this may
require the use of precedents to establish such things as thresholds such as
how readily the information must be ascertainable to allow the ascription of
say, the ReverseEngineerable factor.
All these elements are identified by manual analysis in traditional approaches
to AI and Law as represented by [5] and [1] and are also needed in the semi-
supervised approach of [17]. But the question arises as to whether these elements
can be identified by ML. There is some prospect that they can. The inductive
logic programming approach of [27] was able to derive an effective set of rules
from a set of facts. These rules were able to distinguish the relevant facts from
the irrelevant facts and the antecedents grouped together facts which were re-
lated to a given issue. In the domain used by [27], the facts provided necessary
and sufficient conditions for the outcome, and so the antecedents of these rules
resembled issues. This is because the example domain contained no ‘balance
of factors’ style reasoning. One might speculate that in a less precisely defined
domain, the antecedents would identify factors rather than issues. In such a do-
main the use of association rule mining as in [38] might be more effective, given
that the factor-based rules would be defeasible and provide varying degrees of
support.
Thus with regard to the structural knowledge of the domain, the question is
whether machine learning can identify the elements required to build a justifica-
tion: issues and factors. With regard to individual cases, prediction of an outcome
is not enough: a justification, couched in legal terms, is required, whether to sup-
port a judge making the decision, or to present the reasoning to the public in
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an acceptable way, given the right to explanation in law [22]. Therefore as well
as predicting the outcome, the machine learning system should assign factors to
particular cases, as recommended by [15]. Given the factors, a justification of
the outcome can be produced, using techniques such as those suggested in [28],
perhaps modified to take account of issues as suggested in [10].
5 Concluding Remarks
We have reviewed how legal decisions have been explained in AI and Law, and
the part ML might play. We are currently engaged in a project, motivated by the
above considerations, exploring how ML techniques can be applied to support
making and justifying legal decisions. We will attempt to answer a number of
research questions. We will address the domain of the European Convention on
Human Rights, since there are a number of existing ML approaches for compar-
ison and inspiration, and also the use of more traditional techniques produced
an ADF for Article 6 [20] and a very detailed ADF for deciding questions of ad-
missibility of applications [21]. We will begin by attempting to identify factors
to construct an explanation using the pre-existing ADF of [20]. Next we will
attempt to extend the explanation beyond what is found in CATO inspired ap-
proaches, such as [28], to offer an explanation of why the particular factors were
ascribed to the case in terms of the case facts. If we are successful in these two
objectives, we will then explore the possibility of learning the domain structure.
Explorations will in turn raise a number of questions, both with regard to
ascription in individual cases and to understanding the domain structure, in-
cluding:
– To what extent is the ML process scalable in terms of cost in time and space
resources?
– How close in terms of fidelity are elements identified by ML to those produced
by traditional analysis methods?
– The domain will evolve over time: how can changes in social preferences and
the identification of new factors to consider be accommodated?
We will also wish to perform evaluation with users to explore questions of how
the explanations are received by different audiences, such as:
– To what extent do relevant audiences trust different explanation techniques?
– How well do relevant users perform their different tasks when interpreting
and applying the explanations to new instances?
The development of an effective ML system will be underpinned by three core
aspects: training on a small annotated data set; leveraging domain knowledge as
prior constraints for the learning; and reinforcement learning to allow for more
focused application of expert annotation. We will examine the interplay between
these three aspects, with the assistance of legal expertise, with the intention
of crafting an ML system that can ascribe factors with suitable fidelity and
justification. If successful, we then expect to apply the same three core aspects
to the larger problem of learning the domain structure, in order to produce high
fidelity and justifiable case outcomes directly from the facts of the case.
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